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This research will analyze the impact of the Social Security Program on the 
economy, retirement benefits, fairness of the program, and the risks associated with the 
program. The research will include an in-depth analysis of the current Social Security 
program, followed by different options. The objective of the research is to analyze and 
compare a number of alternatives, then select, and recommend the best one. 
B. DISCUSSION 
On June 8, 1934, President Franklin D. Roosevelt, announced his intention to 
provide a program for Social Security. He formed the Committee of Economic Security 
(CES), composed of five top cabinet level officials to study the entire problem of 
economic insecurity and to make recommendations that would serve as the basis for 
legislative consideration by the congress. In January 1935, the CES reported to the 
President, and on January 17th the President introduced the report to both Houses of 
Congress. After months of debate and intense deliberation, the President signed The 
Social Security Act into law on August 14, 1935. 
Since then, Social Security has grown to become, by far, the largest federal 
program. Coverage has expanded, benefits have increased, and the program has been 
broadened to include benefits for workers’ spouses and minor children, for the survivors 
of deceased workers, and for disabled workers. The federal government currently pays 
monthly Social Security benefits to more than 45 million retired or disabled workers, 
their families, and their survivors. Those benefits will cost the government a total of 
about $430 billion this year, roughly one- quarter of the entire federal budget. (Ref. #1, 
pg1) 
Over the next 30 years, the retirement of the baby-boom generation will pose new 
challenges for the Social Security program, the federal government, and the U.S 
economy. The Social Security Administration projects that the number of people age 65 
or older will rise by more than 90% in the next decades (from 36 million now to 69 
million in 2030), according to its intermediate assumptions. During the same period, the 
number of adults under age 65, who will largely be the ones paying the taxes to support 
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their elders; will grow by only about 15% (from 170 million to 195 million). Moreover, 
the number of elderly people is expected to keep rising more quickly than the number of 
non-elderly people, as life spans continue to lengthen. (Ref. #1, pg1-3) 
This background helps one consider how to prepare for the retirement of the 
baby-boom generation and beyond. The objectives of this project are to: identify the 
problems of and threats to the Social Security program, with the increasing aging of the 
population; compare and contrast the current system with different proposed alternatives; 
and to recommend the best program to increase economic growth and personal control, 
while preserving fairness for the American people.  
C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
1. Primary Research Questions 
a. Is there really a Social Security crisis? 
b. If there is a crisis would privatization help? 
             2. Subsidiary Research Questions 
a. Can Social Security afford to pay what it promises? 
b. How is Social Security financed? 
c. Won’t the trust fund help pay benefits? 
d. Does Social Security treat everyone equally? 
e. Can ordinary workers invest wisely?         
D. SCOPE OF THE PROJECT 
This project will include: (1) a broad examination of the economic, social, 
political, and budgetary aspects of financing Social Security (2) the benefits and 
problems of different alternatives for Social Security compared to the traditional method 
and (3) suggestions and recommendations about the best way of financing Social 
Security. 
E. METHODOLOGY  
The methodology used in this research consisted of: 
1. A literature review of  
a. federal government documents, 
b. reports, studies and analysis (both public and private), 
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c. journal articles and books, and 
d. executive and legislative branch activities 
2. Collection of data concerning Social Security legislation and discussions 
(debate). My collection focused upon the size, scope, and financing of this 
program, and how it has evolved. 
F. ORGANIZATION 
Chapter I:  Introduction, Background 
Chapter II: Social Security Program  
Chapter III: Alternatives for Financing Social Security 
Chapter IV: Analysis of Alternatives 
Chapter V: Conclusions and Recommendations      
G. BENEFIT OF THE STUDY    
This project provides recommendations on the best way to handle the growing 
threats to Social Security with the rapid aging in the United States population by 
comparing viable options. 
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II. THE SOCIAL SECURITY PROGRAM 
A. THE PROGRAM AND THE PROBLEM 
Social Security is a contributory Social Insurance Program: everyone pays in and 
everyone receives benefits. The Social Security Act was passed in 1935 and the first 
benefits were paid in 1940. It is financed by a 12.4 percent tax on wages up to $87,000 
(increases annually). It is the biggest tax most households pay. The Social Security 
program provides retirement, survivors and disability benefits to eligible workers and 
their families. It is the largest government program in the world, taking up almost one-
quarter of the total federal budget. Without change, it could eat up to 29 percent of the 
budget by 2020, 34 percent by 2030, and 36 percent by 2075. (Ref. #2, pg3-4) 
Most Social Security revenues come from payroll taxes. A smaller amount comes 
from taxes on benefits, while the trust fund is credited with interest each year. Social 
Security is a “pay-as-you-go” system: taxes collected from today’s workers are used to 
pay benefits for today’s retirees. For that reason, Social Security’s finances are very 
sensitive to the number of workers paying into the system and the number of retirees 
collecting benefits from it. The “aging” of the population means there are larger groups 
of retirees to be supported with smaller generations of new workers to support them. 
Demographics–particularly birth rates and life expectancies are the key to Social 
Security’s financing problems. Low birth rates mean fewer new workers. Increasing life 
expectancies mean more retirees to support. Future retirees will live years longer than 
today’s 65-year-olds and collect thousands more in benefits. In the future, fewer workers 
will support more retirees. As a matter of simple math, when the ratio of workers to 
retirees falls, each worker must bear a greater financial burden. (Ref. #2, pg7-8) 
Technically, the government’s bonds in the Social Security’s trust fund will help 
pay full benefits until 2041. But why do we say “technically”? Because the Social 
Security trust fund is full of government IOUs, and the only way to turn those IOUs into 
cash is to raise taxes, cut spending, or borrow. Experts say: The Social Security trust fund 
is not a net asset the government can use to pay benefits.  
While the bonds held by the trust funds are assets from the vantage point 
of the Social Security and Medicare programs, from the viewpoint of the 
unified budget they are liabilities of the U.S. Treasury. No one doubts the 
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U.S. Government will honor the bonds. But since the U.S. Treasury is the 
ultimate payer of the programs’ benefits and the trust fund assets are also 
debts of the U.S. Treasury, neither the interest paid on the bonds, nor their 
redemption, provides any new income to the U.S. Treasury. When annual 
revenues from earmarked taxes for Social Security and Medicare begin to 
fall short of annual expenditures, such short falls inevitably must be made 
up by increased taxation, increased borrowing (i.e., the sale of more U.S. 
Treasury bonds to the public) and /or a reduction in other government 
expenditures. This fact is the basis for the view that trust fund assets have 
no “real” economic value. From unified budget viewpoint, the trust fund 
surpluses are a budget accounting device and make no meaningful 
contribution to funding future Social Security or Medicare expenditures. 
They simply reflect the fact that in the past, surplus Social Security and 
Medicare revenues have been used by the U.S. Treasury to fund other 
government programs or to reduce outstanding Federal debt. (John 
Palmer and Thomas Saving, Social Security Public Trustees, 2002) 
     
The trust fund is an asset to Social Security but an equal and opposite debt to the 
rest of the government. From the point of view of the government as a whole and to the 
taxpayers-the trust fund makes no difference. The question isn’t whether we will honor 
the trust fund’s bonds; every-reform legislation in existence would repay them, the 
question is how we will do it. That is why people argue that Social Security’s problems 
begin in 2017, when the program starts running payroll tax deficits, not in 2041 when the 
trust fund runs out. (Ref. #2, pg19) 
Some people think we can borrow to get Social Security “over the hump” of Baby 
Boomer retirements. But Social Security’s problems will continue to grow larger even 
after the Boomers are gone. Borrowing doesn’t reduce Social Security’s deficits; it is just 
a stealth tax increase on our children and grandchildren. That’s what Social Security 
reform is supposed to avoid. If we borrowed to cover Social Security’s deficits, the debt 
would exceed $7 trillion (in today’s dollars) by 2040, $14 trillion by 2050, and over $47 
trillion by 2075. This would be larger than the national debt at the end of World War II 
(as a percent of GDP) and would cripple the U.S economy. (Ref. #2, pg21) 
Social Security’s benefit structure is stuck in the past: it assumes that husbands 
will earn the wages while wives will remain at home, and it punishes couples who do not 
accord with this 1930s norm. A spouse is entitled to her own benefits or benefits equal to 
one-half of the higher earning spouse- but not both. Working women pay an eighth of 
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their wages as taxes, yet 63 percent receive no additional benefits for the taxes they pay. 
They could have received just as much by not working and simply accepting the spousal 
benefit. Social Security rewards single-earner families over dual-earner families, even 
though single-earner families often have higher incomes. Spousal and Survivor benefits 
are extended only to ex-spouses married 10 years or more. Marriages ending in divorce 
have a median length of just 7 years, and fully one-third of all marriages end prior to the 
10 years needed for benefit eligibility. (Ref. #2, pg27-29) 
Social Security benefits last as long as you live, so most benefits go to those who 
live the longest. High income Americans who tend to be white tend to live longer than 
African Americans, who have lower incomes on average. As a result of shorter life spans, 
African Americans receive nearly $21,000 less from Social Security over their lifetimes 
than whites with identical incomes and family profiles, identical people, but very 
different results. Nearly half of all marriages among African Americans are disrupted by 
divorce in less than 10 years, making them ineligible for spousal benefits. A greater 
number of African American women do not remarry after divorce. The Supreme Court 
has ruled that individuals have no legal right to their benefits. This may give “flexibility” 
to the government, but it denies security to workers and retirees. It also encourages 
politicians to make promises today that they may not be able to keep tomorrow. (Ref. #2, 
pg30) 
The Social Security program does have a financial problem. The actuaries at the 
Social Security Administration project that if no action is taken, Social Security will run 
out of money around the year 2034 (using the intermediate assumptions). However, that 
doesn’t mean that Social Security won’t be able to pay benefits at that time. According to 
the intermediate projections, when 2034 arrives, payroll taxes will still be enough to pay 
71% of the benefits. Another set of assumptions is more optimistic (the funds don’t run 
out) and another set is more pessimistic (funds run out in 2034), but most people agree 
that the intermediate assumptions are the ones on which to base our decisions. (Ref. #3, 
pg7-8) 
Social Security’s financial problems are due in part to the very large baby boomer 
generation and longer life spans. When Social Security was first created, it was called 
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“Old Age Insurance”. Life expectancies were less than age 65 and retirement was a 
contingency. Today life expectancies are greater than age 75, and every one talks about 
“when” they retire, not “if”. In fact, someone who is already age 65 can expect to live 
into his or her 80’s. Due to these longer life spans and the retirement of the baby boomer 
generation, there will be fewer workers supporting more retirees in the future (unless we 
make some changes). For instance, today there are almost 3 ½ workers per beneficiary. 
By 2034, the 3 ½ will decrease to just two workers per beneficiary. But 2034 is many 
years away. Why are we so concerned now? (Ref. #3, pg8) Because, in 2008, the very 
large boomer generation can start receiving Social Security retirement benefits (1946 + 
age 62 = 2008), which can cause major problems with the U.S Budget. In order to avoid 
deficits, we may need to have Social Security changes in effect by 2008. (The problems 
are due to the interaction of Social Security with the U.S budget.) Currently Social 
Security receives about $70 billion more than it actually uses. (If one also counts the 
interest that the Treasury pays on Social Security’s government securities, this number is 
over $120 billion.) Beginning around the year 2008, when the baby boomers start to 
retire, the $70 billion in extra taxes from Social Security will start going down, and will 
reach zero around the year 2014. This could cause deficits, which means we would have 
to either increase taxes or decrease government programs at that point. We shouldn’t wait 
until then to decide on the changes. We need to fix Social Security sooner rather than 
later. (Ref. #3, pg8) 
The financial structure of the Social Security program has resulted in a 
redistribution of resources between generations: each generation of workers pays taxes 
that are largely used to make payments to the people already eligible for benefits. From 
Social Security’s earliest days, a contentious issue was whether the benefits that workers 
and their families received should be pre-funded, using the taxes that those workers paid, 
rather than funded using taxes paid by current workers. As the program was enacted in 
1935, revenues dedicated to Social Security would have exceeded outlays by enough to 
build up very large surpluses. In effect, those excess revenues would have helped fund, in 
advance, the benefits that the same workers would receive later. Opponents of pre-
funding argued that such an arrangement would result either in pressure to increase 
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spending or in federal government ownership of private assets. Later expansions of the 
program, along with postponement of increases in the payroll tax rate that were originally 
scheduled to occur during the 1940s, essentially moved Social Security to a pay-as-you-
go basis. That pay-as-you-go structure has worked, although with many changes in taxes 
and benefits along the way. However, it has worked largely because the labor force has 
grown rapidly during much of the program’s history. That situation is about to change, as 
the number of Social Security beneficiaries begins to increase much faster than the 
number of workers. (Ref. #1, pg23-34) 
Social Security is safe today, but will run deficits in only 15 years. That’s not very 
long to fix the world’s biggest government program. The trustees believe the economy 
will slow in the near future because birth rates are low today. Fewer workers equal slower 
economic growth. Faster economic growth won’t help much. Tax revenues will increase, 
but so will the amount that Social Security must pay in benefits. Economic growth could 
double and Social Security would still go broke. The trustees’ “low cost” projections do 
show Social Security solvent for 75 years, but this assumes higher economic growth, 
increased birth rates, reduced improvements in life expectancies, lower unemployment, 
higher inflation, higher interest rates, a one-third increase in immigration, and lower 
incidence of disability. No one seriously believes this will happen. Many demographers 
believe life expectancies will increase faster than the trustee’s project. If so, Social 
Security’s deficits will be bigger- much bigger. (Ref. #5, pg9)   
B. BENEFITS OF SOCIAL SECURITY                     
Social Security has been one of the most successful programs in this country. It is 
probably the primary reason for the dramatic decreases in poverty rates among the 
elderly. Poverty rates among Americans over age 65 decreased from 35% in 1959 to 
about 11% today. This is about the same as poverty rates among people of working ages. 
However, they are still pretty high for very elderly people, especially very elderly, single 
women. (Ref. #3, pg5) 
Social Security is a very complex program with many benefits. If your average 
earnings are $20,000 per year while working, you will have almost half (actually about 
47%) of your earnings replaced by Social Security (or almost $10,000 per year) when 
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you retire. If your average earnings are $60,000 per year, you will have only ¼ (actually 
about 27%) of your earnings replaced (or almost $16,000). Thus, Social Security 
provides a safety net for those that have nothing else; (however, people really need to 
save more in order to maintain their standard of living). In addition, the more one pays in, 
the more one gets from Social Security, but the rate of increase decreases with income. 
This shows Social Security’s goal of individual equity. Without this goal, people might 
try to avoid paying more in taxes, if they knew higher taxes would get nothing for them. 
These benefits are payable at the Social Security Normal Retirement Age, which is the 
age for full benefits; this was age 65 in 1999, however this age gradually increased for 
people born in 1938 and later. Social Security also has early retirement benefits. You can 
receive a benefit as early as age 62, but your benefit will be reduced to reflect the fact 
that you will receive it for more years. In addition, you can delay your retirement date 
and thereby get a larger benefit. Soon, the rules will automatically increase your benefit 
by 8% for every year that you delay your retirement (up to age 70), under the delayed 
retirement credit. (Ref. #3, pg5-6) 
In addition, your retirement benefits from Social Security are guaranteed: they 
don’t depend on how well you invested your money, they increase every year by the rate 
of inflation and they are payable for as long as you live. Currently, you can’t buy 
inflation- indexed annuities from insurance companies and only a few private-sector 
pension plans in the country offer this. This is a very special Social Security benefit. 
Because of it, you don’t need to worry about inflation’s impact on your benefit or 
outliving your benefit, no matter how long you live, and you don’t have to worry about 
how to invest your money.       
Another benefit of Social Security is the disability benefit: If you become 
disabled, you can get the retirement benefits, even if you become disabled at a young age. 
This is an insurance benefit. The value of the disability benefit for an average young 
person with a wife or children could be almost $200,000, which is much more than they 
would have paid in. An additional benefit is the survivor benefit. Your surviving spouse 
receives a benefit if she (or he) is caring for your child (or is disabled and over age 50). 
Both your surviving spouse and the child can get a benefit equal to 75% of your benefit. 
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It could be worth as much as $400,000 for a person who died leaving a spouse and two 
young children, and would be worth much more than was paid in. After your surviving 
spouse reaches age 67, her (his) benefit can start up again at 100% of your benefit, even 
if she (or he) never paid into Social Security. Your spouse can get a spousal retirement 
benefit in addition to yours when you are both alive. Even if your spouse never worked, 
she (or he) would be eligible for a benefit equal to 50% of yours. The survivor and 
spousal benefits are also payable to divorced spouses if the marriage lasted at least 10 
years (and the spouse hasn’t remarried). This is valuable, especially for the traditional 
family where only one spouse works. Social Security has several other benefits as well. 
(Ref. #3, pg7) 
The Social Security program paid monthly benefits to about 45 million people in 
year 2000: more than 28 million retired workers, 5 million disabled workers, and 12 
million family members of retired, disabled or deceased workers. In general, workers are 
eligible for retirement benefits if they are at least age 62 and have had sufficient earnings 
on which they paid Social Security taxes in at least 10 years. Workers whose employment 
has been limited because of a physical or mental disability become eligible at an earlier 
age with a shorter employment history. Various rules apply to family members of retired, 
disabled or deceased workers. Although Social Security is often characterized as a 
retirement program, only about 63% of its beneficiaries receive their payments as retired 
workers. Most of those survivors are widows- either widows age 60 or older or younger 
widows who care for a minor child or who are disabled.    
 C. THE CHALLENGES OF SOCIAL SECURITY WITH THE AGING 
POPULATION  
 
The baby boom generation (those born between 1946 and 1964) is 50 percent 
larger than the generation it is now supporting in retirement. The post-1964 “baby bust” 
generation, on the other hand, is smaller than the generation that it will eventually have to 
help support. Not only are there relatively fewer younger people, but the older people 
they are expected to help support in retirement are living longer as well. When Social 
Security began paying benefits in 1940, only about half of 21-year-old men could expect 
to reach 65 to collect benefits, and those who did, could expect to collect benefits for 12 
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years. By 1990, nearly 75 percent of 21-year-old men can expect to reach 65 and collect 
benefits for 15 years. These trends are expected to continue at least until the middle of the 
21st century. At that time, an expected 83 percent of 21-year-old men will reach 65, and 
they can expect to live another 18 years. As a result, the Social Security Administration 
estimates that the numbers of beneficiaries will more than double by 2050. Moreover, 
because longevity has increased, this level of beneficiaries will tend to persist despite the 
baby bust. Longevity, then, can be expected to permanently change the age distribution of 
the population; even after the baby boom is gone, the number of people over age 65 will 
not drop substantially. (Ref. #6, pg6-7)  
The impact of these demographic trends on the labor force will be dramatic. The 
traditional working-age population (those between the ages of 20 and 64) has increased 
by 13 to 20 million in each decade since 1970. However, it is expected to grow by only 
seven million between 2010 and 2020, and between 2020 and 2030 it is expected to 
actually decrease by 700,000. While the number of expected Social Security beneficiaries 
is doubling, there will be fewer potential wage earners entering the labor force. As a 
result, the potential number of workers supporting each person over 65 will plummet. 
Trends in labor force participation among workers over age 55 could make the situation 
even worse. Although people are living longer, they are not working longer. In fact, the 
average retirement age has decreased substantially over the past few decades, due in large 
part to the dramatic decreases in labor force participation among men. Between 1950 and 
1985, the participation rates for men between age 55 and 64 declined from just under 90 
percent to just over 65 percent. To stabilize the ratio of retirees to workers, U.S. fertility 
would have to surge back to the baby boom levels of the 1950s and early 1960s. That is 
not expected to occur. The United States already has one of the highest fertility rates in 
the developed world, and only 10 percent of Americans (as opposed to 50 percent in the 
1950s) desire to raise families of the size common during the 1950s. (Ref. #6, pg8-9)              





III. ALTERNATIVES FOR FINANCING SOCIAL SECURITY 
A. MODIFYING THE CURRENT SOCIAL SECURITY PROGRAM 
The Social Security system has enjoyed broad public support and served as a 
safety net for elderly Americans for decades. However, a flood of baby boomers on the 
verge of retirement and the relatively smaller number of younger workers to support them 
threaten the long-term solvency of the Social Security Trust Fund. The Social Security 
Amendments of 1983 were the last comprehensive changes made to the Social Security 
program. These Amendments raised the program’s taxes and reduced certain benefits. 
The changes were intended to keep the program solvent for at least 75 years, until 2058. 
Since the mid-1980s, a relatively large amount of special-issue Treasury debt has 
accumulated in the Social Security Trust Funds, which is expected to grow even larger 
over the next decade. When members of the baby boom generation begin retiring in large 
numbers, around 2015, investment earnings on trust fund assets (and later the assets 
themselves) will be required to supplement payroll taxes so the program can continue to 
meet its benefit obligations. (Ref. #7, pg1) 
Despite the large accumulation of trust fund assets, for a number of reasons, 
current projections are less favorable than those made in 1983. Social Security’s Board of 
Trustees now projects that, unless the system is changed, the trust fund will run out of 
money about two decades earlier than 2058. Congress is considering far-reaching options 
for reform to restore Social Security to long-range, sustainable balance. If and when 
reforms are enacted, however, actual experience will inevitably diverge from the 
demographic and economic assumptions on which the changes are based, and Social 
Security may again slip out of balance. Congress can choose to address such imbalances 
by enacting new ad hoc changes or by establishing a mechanism to automatically adjust 
the program back into balance. (Ref. #7, pg1) 
There are two general types of solutions. We can either decrease Social Security 
benefits or increase taxes (or investment income) 
 
 
1. Decrease Benefits 
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There are at least five options to decrease (or delay) benefits. The first option 
addresses head on the fact that we are living longer; it would raise the Retirement Age 
for full benefits. Currently, Social Security’s Normal Retirement Age, or full benefits 
age is 67, for people born in 1960 and later. Thus, Generation X’ers will have to wait 
until age 67 to get full benefits from Social Security, that is, two years longer than current 
retirees waited to get full benefits. Of course, since they are expected, on average, to live 
more than two years longer, they will get at least as many years of benefits as current 
retirees (on average). (Ref. #3, pg10) 
One option is to increase the retirement age to 70 by the year 2030. 
Thereafter, this option would continue to increase the retirement age for 
full benefits (but at a slower rate), in order to keep the system from going 
out of balance in the future. Generation X’ers would have to wait at least 
three years longer to get a benefit compared with the current rules, 
although they would still get benefits for more years than people who 
retired in the early years of Social Security. This would affect a lot of 
people, which is why this option would solve over ½ of Social Security’s 
current financial problems. Supporters of this option note that it makes 
sense since we are living longer, and we are healthier at older ages now. 
As I mentioned already, it could help solve about ½ of Social Security’s 
financial problem. (In fact, if we raised the retirement age to 73, it would 
solve all of the problem- but I bet that Congress won’t do that.) 
Opponents of raising the normal retirement age note that it could be 
difficult for people who have physically demanding jobs and others who 
can’t find work, or for those who are partially disabled (but not disabled 
enough to get disability benefits). It could also increase the average age of 
the workforce and raise employer costs for wages and benefits, such as 
health care. Employers could encourage us to retire by improving our 
pensions, but that would cost a lot too. Some people question whether 
employers will hire us at older ages. They wonder if our health is 
improving as fast as our life span. Supporters cite recent studies, however, 
that indicate that we are healthier now at age 70 then people were at age 
65 when Social Security was enacted. In addition, before Social Security 
most people worked to age 70 and beyond. Opponents also note that low-
income minorities with shorter life spans would be affected more by this 
provision. Supporters note, however, that they are helped by the 
progressive benefit formula of Social Security, so they will still receive 
better money’s worth on average, than other groups. By the way, you can 
still retire at age 62 under the current rules, and if you do, your benefit 
will be smaller to reflect the fact that you will get your benefit for more 
years. For example, if and when the retirement age for full benefits 
becomes 70, then the benefit at age 62 would be 55% of your benefit at 
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age 70. Thus an increase in the retirement age for full benefits is a 
decrease in benefits (except for disability retirees-they would not be 
affected by an increase in the retirement age) and it does reduce the 
money’s worth of our contributions, which is true for most solutions to fix 
Social Security. (Ref. #3, pg10-11) 
 
The second option is to Reduce the Cost of Living Adjustments (or COLAs) 
that retirees get each year. Currently, benefits go up by the annual Consumer Price Index 
(or CPI) so that retirees can buy the same quantity of goods and services each year. 
However, some people think that the CPI overstates inflation rates. A Congressional 
Commission (informally called the Boskin Commission), reported that the CPI was too 
high by 1.1%. One suggested option might be to reduce the COLA to CPI minus 0.5 
percent. If the Commission was correct, people’s purchasing power would not go down 
and this could solve about 33% of Social Security’s financial problems, a very powerful 
correction just for a 0.5 percent reduction. (Ref. #3, pg11)  
However, the Bureau of Labor Statistics has recently improved their calculation 
of the CPI. They expect it to lower the CPI by about 0.75%. Thus, opponents of this 
option are concerned that reducing the CPI further by 0.5 percent could mean that retirees 
would fall behind in purchasing power by 0.5 percent each year. (Ref. #3) Particularly 
hits the very elderly, where poverty rates are much higher than middle age people 
(especially for women). In addition, opponents want the calculation of the CPI to be a 
technical calculation, not a political decision.  
The third option is to reduce benefits by 5%. This reduction could be phased in 
over five years, so current retirees (and those currently eligible to retire) would not be 
affected. People at all income levels would have their benefits reduced by 5%. This 
option would solve about 23% of Social Security’s financial problems. Opponents note 
that this would be especially difficult on people with low incomes, since they often rely 
on Social Security for all (or almost all) of their retirement income. This would also 
increase Supplemental Security Income (SSI) and Medicaid costs. Supporters think 
everyone should be a part of the solution, even people with low incomes. In response to 
the concern for low income people, they think that the progressive tilt in the benefit 
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formula is adequate and that making it more progressive would make the value of Social 
Security even worse for high earners. (Ref. #3, pg12) 
The fourth option is to gradually reduce benefits for those retired people, whose 
total retirement income (including Medicare, which is about $6000 per spouse) exceeds a 
certain level for example, $45,000 per year. It is sometimes called an affluence test or 
means test. Once a family’s total retirement income reaches $110,000 in any year, one 
would get only 15% of his\her Social Security benefit. Thus, how one thinks about this 
option, may depend on where one stands. This option would solve 75% of Social 
Security’s financial problem. Supporters note that this option preserves benefits to those 
most in need and reduces them for those who don’t need them as much. Opponents note 
that the option hurts people who save more, a behavior we want to encourage not 
discourage. It could also discourage pensions. This option might also encourage abuse. 
People might hide their income, put their assets in trusts or give it to their kids, so that 
their Social Security benefit is not cut. In response, the government could write 
regulations to stop the abuse, which could become quite complex and intrusive. Another 
concern is that an Affluence Test could change the very nature of the Social Security 
program, moving it away from a universal program where benefits are based on how 
much you contribute to one based on need. Opponents would rather use the progressive 
tax system to handle this or make the benefit formula more progressive. (Ref. #3, pg12-
13) 
Another option is to increase the number of years for calculating your benefit, 
for example from 35 to 40. Currently, benefits are based on the highest 35 years of 
earnings. Additional years of work beyond 35 years do not improve the benefit much. 
One option would rise the 35 years to 40, which would solve 21% of the problem. If you 
worked full-time for at least 40 years, this option would not significantly change your 
benefit. However, if you didn’t work full-time for at least 40 years, your benefit could go 
down by as much as 12%. Opponents note that this would have the unintended 
consequence of hurting women who take time out to take care for their families. 
Supporters note it would encourage people to work longer in order to get a better 
benefit. This would be good for the country because it would create more productivity, 
 17
and it would help bring in more contributions for Social Security. (This option makes the 
charge for early retirement more accurate. The current method doesn’t reflect the fact that 
early retirees contribute less to Social Security.) Furthermore, supporters don’t want to 
hurt women who stay at home for child birth and child care reasons. This problem could 
be remedied by providing women with “drop out” years for periods when they are 
carrying or caring for a child. (Ref. #3, pg13)    
2. Increasing Taxes 
The next three options would solve Social Security’s problems by raising taxes.  
Option six suggests we raise the payroll tax rate. Right now, 6.2% of wages are paid 
into Social Security by the employee and with an equal amount paid by the employer. 
Self employed individuals pay both parts, for a total of 12.4% of earnings. This option 
would increase the total tax rate by 1% of wages (half to employees and half to 
employers), so that employees and employers would each pay 6.7%, for a total of 13.4% 
of wages. Supporters note that this would solve almost half of Social Security’s current 
financial problems and that people prefer a tax increase over a benefit decrease. Raising 
the total payroll tax rate by 2%, to 14.6%, would solve the current financial problems of 
Social Security, if it was really saved. Opponents ask where the money would come 
from. Employers would have to raise prices if they could or lower their costs, such as 
labor costs. Low income people may take it out of their 401(k) contributions and lose 
their employer’s matching contribution. Others might have to borrow more or to consume 
less. Opponents also note that we may have to increase payroll taxes for Medicare too, so 
that total payroll taxes could get much higher in total. In addition, as we continue to live 
longer, we will have to increase taxes every 20 or 25 years (unless we really save the 
money). This would tax future generations more than we were willing to tax ourselves 
today. It will be too late then for our children to cut our benefits or increase our 
retirement ages, so they could be forced into paying higher taxes than what we ever paid. 
Since this option is particularly difficult on lower income people, many would prefer that 
only higher income people pay more taxes. (Ref. #3, pg14) 
A seventh option is to tax Social Security benefits like pension benefits from a 
private pension plan. In 1999, a retired couple with a $20,000 pension and nothing else 
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would have been taxed around $500. But if the income was all from Social Security, 
there was no tax on it. This is because you are not taxed on your Social Security benefits 
if your total income (including 50% of Social Security) is below $32,000 (or $25,000 if 
you are single). Above those thresholds, you are taxed on only half of your Social 
Security benefit. However, if this income is above $44,000 ($34,000 if you are single), 
then up to 85% of your Social Security benefit is taxable; not the whole benefit since 
your contributions were taxed already. (Congress chose 85% because approximately 15% 
of your benefit comes from your own contributions which have already been taxed; the 
rest of your Social Security benefit is attributed to investment earnings and your 
employer’s contributions, which have not been taxed.) Opponents are concerned that this 
might hurt low and middle income people. However, Supporters note that low income 
people would not be touched by this proposal. In fact, 30% of retirees would pay no 
income tax due to the exemptions and deductions in the Federal Income Tax system. 
Only middle income people would be affected. This option wouldn’t solve much of 
Social Security’s financial problems (only 14% of the problem). Supporters also see this 
option as a way for all generations to be a part of the solution, even current retirees, and 
they note that it simplifies tax laws. They question why two retirees with the same 
income are taxed differently, just because one person gets their benefit from Social 
Security and the other doesn’t. (Ref. #3) 
An eighth option would require all newly hired State and Local Government 
workers to be in Social Security. Some state and local workers participate only in their 
own pension systems and don’t participate in Social Security. This option would require 
new employees to be in Social Security. Supporters say that Social Security should be 
universal, and that most people support this option (except some of those who would be 
affected). Since many state and local workers get Social Security through work at other 
jobs, they should have to pay their fair share. Opponents note that these workers do fine 
under their own systems, so why change the rules. In addition, it would divert employee 
and employer contributions from their government plans. This option would bring more 
money into the system in the short run, but would solve only about 10% of Social 
Security’s financial problems.  
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3. Unintended Consequences  
We have discussed some of the possible solutions. However, there are problems 
that could accompany these solutions. Decreasing Social Security benefits (or increasing 
the retirement age for full benefits) may increase reliance on the private pension system. 
That would shift costs to employees and employers. People need a certain amount of 
income to live and retirement is a financial decision. With smaller Social Security 
benefits (or later retirement), many individuals would have to work longer (if they can). 
An older workforce would increase employer costs, such as wages and employee health, 
disability, life insurance, annual leave, and sick leave benefits. If employers don’t want 
an older workforce and the associated additional costs, they could lay off their older 
employees (always a difficult thing to do) or encourage them to retire by improving the 
company pension plan, but that would also be costly.  
Due to a huge increase in the number of retirements early in the next century, 
employers may want to rethink their retirement strategies and encourage employees to 
stay on (at least part-time). Phased retirement may become popular, but IRS regulations 
would need to be revised to allow in-service distributions to be payable before a pension 
plan’s Normal Retirement Age. In addition, it is quite difficult for employers to increase 
their Retirement Ages in tandem with Social Security, unless pension laws were changed 
to allow higher normal retirement ages than age 65 and relax the rules against decreasing 
benefits. Otherwise, employers will have to calculate two separate pension amounts for 
service before and after each change in the retirement age. This would be very complex 
for employees to understand. However, it appears that Congress may want to allow 
employers some of the same flexibility (such as increasing the normal retirement age, 
decreasing benefits for early retirement etc). Finally, decreased Social Security benefits 
could necessitate changing the non-discrimination rules to reduce the disparity in benefits 
between low- and highly-compensated employees. (Ref. #3, pg17) 
If Social Security COLA’s are decreased, there will be more pressure on 
employer pension plans to give greater ad hoc increases to older retirees. It might 
encourage more lifetime annuity-type benefits and COLAs in pension plans. Employers 
with Defined Contribution plans might still be able to wash their hands of this problem, 
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especially if all ties have been severed with the former employees by paying lump sums 
and not providing post-retirement of any kind. Employees should prefer Defined Benefit 
plans, especially if inflation could be high in their retirement, but they may not be 
thinking that far ahead. As mentioned earlier, a means test would discourage savings and 
pension plans. It would also confuse offset plans and the rules that integrate pension 
benefits with Social Security. The employer pension would affect the Social Security 
benefit, which would in turn affect the pension, and back and forth. Individuals who were 
clearly above the means testing threshold would need more income from their employer 
pension plan or they would need to save more. A means test would also encourage 
gaming the system. People would accelerate or delay their employer pension to get their 
full Social Security benefits. If the means test is based on income, people with large 
pensions would want to receive their benefits in a lump sum; so that they would only lose 
their Social Security benefit in one year. People with small pensions would not want a 
lump sum; because their pension would not reduce their Social Security benefit, but a 
lump sum would hurt them in the year of receipt. If the means test is based on wealth, 
people with large pensions might delay their pension for as long as possible or get it early 
in a lump sum and hide it or transfer it to a trust or child. (Ref. #3, pg17) 
If we increase Social Security taxes, the money has to come from somewhere. 
Low paid employees may take it from their 401(k) contributions and lose the match. 
Highly compensated employees would be restricted because of non-discrimination rules. 
If the employee has no pension plan, the increased contribution would have to come from 
their savings or their consumption. If employers have to pay more into Social Security, 
they may reduce pension benefits or drop them altogether. If the wage base is increased 
or eliminated, it will affect covered compensation and integrated plans. If other forms of 
compensation other than wages are taxed (such as pensions and benefits or pension 
trusts), employers might reduce or drop them, due to the loss of tax advantages. If the 
health and pension benefit are not taxed, then it might encourage them to provide these. 
Obviously, there are repercussions involved in these proposed options. Unintended 
consequences should be considered before implementing changes such as these. (Ref. #3, 
pg19)  
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4. Private Sector Investments  
So far the discussion has been about either decreasing benefits or increasing taxes. 
Another way suggested to help solve Social Security’s financial problems would be to 
invest in the private sector, sometimes called privatization. Either the Social Security 
program administrators or individuals could do the investing. This option is quite 
controversial on Capital Hill, because the two political parties are split on which type of 
privatization they prefer (and possibly because there has been no experience with 
privatization in the United States). Currently, Social Security’s Trust Funds can only be 
invested in government securities. Investing these funds in the private sector could yield 
Social Security a higher investment return. That would also reduce the arguments about 
whether the government really saves money when it buys Treasury Bills and securities. It 
could also increase national savings if additional savings were required on top of the 
current payroll tax. This sounds like a free lunch! However, it is not; like all other 
solutions discussed above, this change doesn’t solve all of Social Security’s current 
financial problems. We would still have to raise some taxes or cut some benefits, or do a 
little of both. These statements are true whether the Social Security administrators or 
individuals invest in the stock market, because Social Security has historically been a 
pay-as-you-go system. (Ref. #3, pg19-20) 
Consider further these two approaches to privatization. Under the first approach, 
Social Security would hire investment managers to gradually invest up to 40% of its 
Trust Fund assets in the private sector. This option could solve about 40% of Social 
Security’s financial problems. Opponents argue that with their assets reaching up to 5% 
of the total market, Social Security investment decisions and stock voting could become 
politicized. They also worry that a large Trust Fund might tempt Congress to improve 
benefits too easily. Supporters note that the government already invests in the stock 
market without these problems and using stock market indexes could avoid the concern 
that Social Security would manipulate the market. Proxy voting could be delegated to the 
money managers. In addition, they note that Social Security could get higher rate of 
investment return than if individuals did the investing, the administrative and investment 
expenses would be less, and there would be less risk to individuals. With respect to the 
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concern that Congress might use the money, supporters note that Congress would be less 
likely to use the money than now. (Ref. #3, pg20) 
Alternatively, individuals could do the investing to avoid the concern over 
governance. Supporters prefer advance funding, want the higher return, and want to 
avoid reducing benefits as much as possible. They suggest that Individual Accounts (even 
with the risks placed on individuals) are the lesser evil, because they don’t trust the 
government getting involved in investment decisions. Other supporters philosophically 
prefer individual responsibility over corporate responsibility and they like the idea of 
wealth accumulation for everyone. The Individual Account proposal would require all 
individuals to invest their payroll taxes directly in the private sector. They would then 
reap the better returns. Workers could have their own individual accounts and control 
their own investment decisions. It could be on top of Social Security, as a part of Social 
Security, or instead of Social Security. However, opponents note that this could have 
much larger administrative and investment costs than if the government did the investing. 
(Ref. #3, pg21) 
In addition, there would be very large transition costs to change over to a totally 
privatized system. In 1996, when over 90% of Social Security’s money was being paid 
out to current beneficiaries and the US Budget was in a deficit, most reform proposals 
suggested paying for the transition through add-ons (i.e., increased contributions to 
Social Security). Supporters noted that these proposals would increase national savings, 
investment, and productivity. Opponents asked where this money would come from. 
Some people worried that employees would take it out of their 401(k) contributions and 
lose the employer match. In addition, employers might take it from their pension 
contributions. Tax lobbyists say that add-ons are tax increases, even though the money 
would go to retirement accounts. Supporters of Individual Accounts point out that those 
additional benefit cuts could be offset by the increased benefits from the Individual 
Accounts. Opponents note that this only may happen if the stock market does well. In 
addition, they suggest that many people may not do well during the transitional period, 
because the advantages of investing in the private sector take time to build up.       
B. SOCIAL SECURITY REFORM AROUND THE WORLD: LESSONS 
FROM OTHER COUNTRIES 
 23
Social Security programs in most countries, including the United States, follow 
the model first adopted in Europe: they are financed by mandatory payroll taxes and 
provide benefits to current retirees. A financial crisis facing these pay-as-you-go systems 
is approaching rapidly as fertility rates decline and life expectancies increase worldwide. 
A growing number of countries have taken steps to avoid the crisis by allowing workers 
and employers to choose private alternatives to their public retirement systems. At least 
20 countries have introduced forced savings programs, requiring workers to save for their 
own retirement. A broad number of countries have either partially privatized their 
systems or have a private option; some countries require employers to provide pensions 
on top of the traditional Social Security program. (Ref. #4, pg1) 
Chile was the first nation in the Western Hemisphere to adopt a Social Security 
system (1929) and the first nation in the world to completely privatize one. More than 90 
percent of Chilean workers chose the private option soon after it was announced in 1981. 
Currently, employees pay 10 percent of their wages to the Chilean equivalent of 
Individual Retirement Accounts. Individuals cannot direct their own investments. 
However, they can choose among 21 competing private investment companies, which are 
similar to U.S. mutual funds. These funds are required to invest conservatively in a 
diversified portfolio of stocks and bonds. An employee dissatisfied with his or her fund 
can easily switch to another. Workers must also contribute to private life and disability 
insurance, bringing the total required contribution to about 13 percent. The benefits of 
this approach are compelling. Retirement benefits, which depend on the rate of return 
earned by private accounts, have generally been anywhere from 50 to 70 percent higher 
under the new system than the old Social Security program. (Ref. #8, pg2) Chile’s reform 
has been such an overwhelming economic and political success that similar reforms have 
recently been adopted in Argentina and Peru; other countries across Latin America are 
implementing or considering similar reforms. (Ref. #4, pg2) 
Like Chile, Singapore has a private retirement system. Unlike Chile’s, 
Singapore’s system was private from its inception in 1955. Residents are required to save 
for all manner of needs: retirement, medical expenses, education, even the purchase of a 
home. The rate of contribution for both employers and employees is 20 percent. In effect, 
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residents of Singapore are forced to save 40 percent of their incomes. At retirement – 
generally at age 55 – workers must purchase an annuity with a portion of their funds. The 
annuity pays a fixed sum for the rest of the individual’s life, thus ensuring a steady 
stream of income. The country’s pragmatic commitment to economic growth has assured 
a steady source of capital for investment and undoubtedly is responsible for the country’s 
high economic growth rate. As a result of these high rates of contribution, Singapore has 
the highest saving rate in the world. It also has the highest home ownership rate, with 
about 85 percent of the population living in homes they own. (Ref. # 8, pg2)     
European countries are also searching for private alternatives; Britain is leading 
the way. Britain’s two-tiered system consists of a bottom tier (a minimum income paid to 
all retirees) and a second earnings-based tier that is comparable to a private pension. In 
1978, the British government began permitting employers to contract their employees out 
of the second tier by providing them with a private pension at least as generous as the 
government pension they would have received. Since 1988, all British workers have been 
allowed to individually opt out of the second tier by setting up personal pension accounts, 
similar to American IRAs. Through these private options, more than 70 percent of British 
workers have moved out of the second tier. Individuals who contract out give up the right 
to draw a second tier pension from the state. In return, they receive a tax reduction of 4.8 
percentage points. In general, the tax reduction is calculated so that employees will, on 
average, gain financially from contracting out. (Ref. # 8, pg3)   
Virtually unknown, however, are the large number of countries that have at least 
partially privatized systems or a private option. In Switzerland, Denmark and Finland, the 
government provides everyone with a basic flat retirement benefit that is means-tested to 
some degree. Additional income related benefits, analogous to the earnings-related tier in 
Britain, are provided by mandatory employer pensions. In Japan and Mauritius, the 
government pays a flat retirement benefit to everyone, plus additional benefits related to 
earnings during working years. But workers with private employer pensions or 
occupational plans, providing at least equivalent benefits, are allowed out of the public 
earnings-related system. In Greece, workers with approved employer or occupational 
plans, providing at least equivalent benefits, are allowed out of the entire public system. 
 25
In Pakistan, employers provide survivor and disability benefits through private life and 
disability insurance. In Trinidad and Tobago and the Seychelles, the government requires 
participation only in a basic plan, paying a flat benefit to everyone. Payment into the 
earnings-related tier is voluntary, and workers can choose to pay into a private plan 
instead. (Ref. #4, pg3) 
In addition, some countries with provident fund systems allow workers with an 
equivalent private-sector plan to opt out entirely of the public system. These include 
India, Sri Lanka, Nepal, Fiji and Gambia. Malaysia allows such a voluntary opt-out for 
teachers, soldiers, the self-employed and domestic workers. Some countries have no 
public Social Security system at all, leaving retirement benefits entirely in the private 
sector. These include Malawi, Burma (Myanmar), Georgia, Sierra Leone, Armenia, 
Azerbaijan, Bangladesh, Botswana, Somalia, Uzbekistan and Zimbabwe. In addition, the 
Ethiopian system applies only to government employees or employees of government 
enterprises or associations, leaving all other workers to provide privately for their 
retirement. (Ref. #4, pg3-4) 
C. PERSONAL ACCOUNTS FOR SOCIAL SECURITY 
Some analysts are calling for the U.S Social Security system to allow individuals 
to accumulate a portion of their Social Security contribution in an individual account, 
which could be invested in private markets. Advocates for this approach assert that it 
would provide workers with more control over their retirement security. A range of 
legislative proposals would require (or allow) workers to accumulate all or part of their 
Social Security retirement funds in accounts similar to today’s individual retirement 
accounts (IRAs). The funds typically would be administered by professional investment 
managers. The government could restrict investment choices to reduce administrative 
costs and to provide workers with additional protection. However, individual account 
owners would make the basic investment decisions and accept the accompanying risks. 
(Ref. #9, pg1-2) 
A fundamental question is whether individual worker participation in a privatized 
system would be voluntary or mandatory. If voluntary, the old system would have to 
continue indefinitely for those who choose not to participate. In this case, workers would 
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choose the option most favorable to their specific circumstances, adding to program 
costs. In addition, running dual programs would be more complicated and more 
expensive administratively. If participation in the individual account program became 
mandatory, and only a portion of the existing program was privatized, a two-tiered 
program would be necessary. For example, one tier would pay a government-guaranteed 
benefit; the other tier would contain an individual account component. Under some 
proposals, the government-guaranteed defined benefit would be flat, that is, not varying 
by income level, while the benefits derived from the individual accounts would vary both 
by income level and investment results. The flat benefit would be lower than current 
Social Security benefits, since part of the payroll tax would be used to fund individual 
accounts. (Ref. #9, pg3) 
Under an individual account approach, investment risk shifts from the Social 
Security program to the individual. This transfer of risk could have a significant impact 
on the success of an individual account program. Some individual investors do not take a 
long-term view, due to liquidity needs or limited personal resources. Some individuals 
lack access to investment information and the necessary sophistication to make effective 
investment decisions. Additionally, individuals or even cohorts of workers cannot absorb 
the same risk as Social Security program as a whole, especially during periods when 
market values drop sharply. For both financial and psychological reasons, individuals are 
less able to ride out periods of poor market performance. Individuals could become even 
more risk-averse if the Social Security safety net were reduced to a minimum benefit or 
eliminated altogether.  
Absent a government guarantee, individuals are also more vulnerable to losing 
their principal. Principal could be lost due to an issuer’s bankruptcy, inappropriate 
investment advice, or even securities fraud. For these reasons, many individuals will steer 
a risk adverse course in directing their investments. Retirees and workers near retirement 
are especially likely to adopt conservative investment practices and receive lower returns.  
In summary, if enough consistently high-yielding investment exists, and 
individuals invest in them, net investment yields under an individual account approach 
may be greater on average than under the current Social Security program. However, it 
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may not be reasonable to assume that individuals will earn the historically high returns of 
equity markets or the returns realized by traditional employer-provided pension plans. 
Workers will need investment education to ensure they recognize the opportunities as 
well as the risks of the private market. Lower paid workers, in particular, will need 
education, because many of them will have no prior investment experience. It should be 
noted that individuals, regardless of their level of investment education or financial 
expertise, will still be vulnerable to fluctuations in the private market, especially at the 
time that they expect to retire. (Ref. #9, pg4)   
Over the long term, a funded system could pay higher benefits at lower cost than 
the current pay-as-you-go program. But to get to a funded system, we have to put up the 
funds. That’s true whether we fund Social Security through personal accounts, collective 
government investment, or by retiring existing public debt. When someone talks about 
the “cost” of personal accounts, they are really referring to the amount we would put 
aside today to help pay benefits tomorrow. Is that really a cost? Personal accounts are no 
more “expensive” than any other means of pre-funding Social Security; they are a lot 
cheaper than raising taxes down the road. Personal accounts would be split 50-50 
between divorcing spouses. These assets, left to compound until retirement, could 
significantly increase the benefits for women who might otherwise retire into poverty. 
African Americans do rely disproportionately on Social Security’s disability protections, 
but adding personal accounts for retirement can make the system more progressive and 
fair. (Ref. #2, pg25)  
Some argue that the economy will slow in the future, so stock returns will also 
fall. No one knows for sure, but stock returns, which have averaged seven percent, would 
have to fall a lot to be below Social Security’s two percent returns. Social Security’s 
independent actuaries forecast 6.5 percent real annual stock returns.  
Some argue that ordinary workers couldn’t manage their own money. But 
millions of ordinary workers have already begun investing successfully through IRA and 
401(k) plans. Average workers, aged 60-65 and earning $15-25k, have just 23 percent of 
their 401(k) account in stocks. Workers in dozens of countries around the world have 
already invested in personal accounts. Are workers in Chile, Australia or Mexico smarter 
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than Americans? What the opposition is really saying is “low-income workers are too 
stupid to invest.” This is patronizing and demeaning. (Ref. #5, pg35) 
At retirement, individual accounts could be converted into annuities that pay a 
fixed monthly income. These annuities could be designed to pay increasing benefits, so 
that payments would approximately reflect changes in the cost of living. While Social 
Security benefits are indexed directly to the Consumer Price Index (CPI), such indexing 
of private annuity benefits is not generally available. One consideration is whether 
insurance companies would be able to offer CPI-indexed, or inflation-indexed annuities. 
Another basic question is whether benefits derived from individual accounts could be 
paid in forms other than life annuities, and under what circumstances exceptions would 
be permitted.  
Preservation of capital during the working years is a serious issue, as many 
workers have legitimate needs: health-care, emergencies, unemployment, natural 
disasters, etc. these workers would seek to withdraw (or borrow) funds from their 
individual accounts for non retirement purposes. The evolution of loan provisions in 
current 401(k) and IRA plans illustrates the issues involved. Initially, these funds were 
off-limits until retirement. If funds were withdrawn, a stiff tax penalty was imposed. 
Then, as workers clamored for access to meet important pre-retirement financial needs, 
loan provisions were enacted into law. If retirement funds cannot be preserved and used 
for retirement, workers could actually be worse off in retirement under a privatization 
arrangement than under the existing program, even with an increased level of funding and 
higher rates of return in the private equity market.  
Preserving funds after retirement poses yet another problem. Individuals, who do 
not convert their accounts into annuities at retirement, risk the possibility of outliving 
their resources, especially if the individual account is their primary source of income. 
Without the restraint provided by a lifetime Social Security annuity or pension payment, 
some retirees may consume their individual account balances too rapidly. A large group 
of people with a sharply reduced standard of living could place heavy burdens on 
government safety nets. (Ref. #9, pg3) 
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Administrative costs of the existing Social Security program are very low, less 
than one percent of outflow. Critics of privatization question whether private-sector 
investment managers could match this. In addition, there would be new costs associated 
with privatization, including marketing expenses and possible commissions, collection, 
enforcement, allocation, educating the public on investing, new record keeping 
requirements, etc. Higher costs would partially offset the expected higher investment 
returns and affect the level of benefits available from the individual accounts. 
Privatization advocates counter that Social Security’s administrative costs are low partly 
because employers provide much of the program’s administrative work. Individual 
Account proposals could also reduce administrative costs by taking advantage of the 
current infrastructure for tax collection. For example, employers could send their 
employees’ Individual Account contributions to the government with other taxes they are 
required to file in a bulk check. The government would hold the contributions (plus 
interest) until they identified how much each worker contributed through income tax 
returns. The government would then forward the appropriate contribution to the 
individual’s chosen investment manager. Under this procedure, there is a period of time 
(up to one year in some instances) that workers would not have investment control over a 
portion of their accounts. This could be important during times of market volatility. (Ref. 
#9, pg3) 
Under Social Security’s current system, the program’s continued existence 
depends on receiving future tax income to meet obligations to current and near term 
beneficiaries. If payroll taxes are diverted into private accounts, benefits would need to 
be reduced, or taxes would have to be increased to meet the program’s benefit 
obligations. Moreover, to the extent that Social Security’s trust fund build-up masks the 
government’s deficit, any reduction in the trust fund build-up hurts the unified budget. 
For these reasons, most individual account proposals would have to be phased in over 
several decades, providing enough income to pay benefits to current retirees, while 
simultaneously building up substantial private accounts for younger workers. Under some 
proposals, individuals who already had benefits accrued under the existing program 
would be treated differently. The youngest workers, perhaps those under 30, might forfeit 
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all accrued benefits under the existing program. Middle-aged workers might get some 
past-service credit but not accrue additional benefits. The oldest workers, those closest to 
retirement, might not see a decrease in their initial benefit, but their cost of living 
increases could be reduced, or they might have to pay higher payroll or income taxes. To 
pay benefits to these workers and to current retirees, additional revenue would be needed 
for several decades. In effect, several future generations would have to finance their own 
retirement and maintain the existing program for their elders.  
             There is a lot of speculation and uncertainty about the effectiveness of 
privatization by many people, including policy makers in the United States. But there was 
almost the same concern about personal accounts in most of the countries which had 
replaced their old Social Security systems with the new private systems. The next chapter 
analyzes how Chile successfully switched its long-term problematic Social Security 



















IV. CASE ANALYSIS OF PRIVATIZATION 
A. PRIVATIZATION THROUGH IRA ACCOUNTS IN CHILE 
Chile was the first nation in the Western Hemisphere to adopt a Social Security 
system (1929) and the first nation in the world to completely privatize that system. The 
Chilean system involves forced saving for retirement and adverse contingencies; it has 
much in common with the provident fund systems of Singapore and other former British 
colonies. Since Chile allows competition among private companies that manage the 
individual savings accounts. Because workers are free to choose among portfolio 
managers, the Chilean system in many ways is similar to a U.S.-type IRA system. (Ref. 
#4, pg12) 
1. The Old Social Security System  
The old Chilean Social Security program was patterned after the traditional social 
insurance programs in Europe. The system paid retirement, survivors, and disability 
benefits and was financed by a payroll tax that eventually was over 20 percent of wages. 
The employer paid more than half of this tax, and employees paid the remainder. The 
system accumulated some reserve funds, which were invested, but it was far from fully 
funded. Instead, it tended to operate on a pay-as-you-go basis. In the years prior to its 
dismantling, revenues were routinely insufficient to pay promised benefits. In 1980, 
general tax revenues financed 28 percent of the system’s benefits, and the annual Social 
Security deficit was projected to grow sharply in future years. (Ref. #4, pg12) 
The old system actually consisted of many separate Social Security systems: one 
for manual workers, one for salaried employees, one for government workers and about 
50 additional programs for workers in different occupations and locations. (Ref. #4, 
pg12-13) One unfortunate consequence of this diversity was that the groups with the 
greatest political influence had the most favorable programs. For example: some salaried 
workers received retirement benefits equal to 100 percent of average wages for their last 
five years of employment, while manual workers received only 75 percent: Some 
workers paid lower payroll taxes than other workers for similar benefits: Under the 
general system for salaried workers, pension payments were indexed for at least two 
years, whereas the general system for manual workers had no automatic inflation-
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indexing. The special benefits and tax breaks almost always favored politically 
influential, higher income workers. Low and middle income workers usually had to pay 
higher taxes to finance these special benefits. Workers who knew they would not qualify 
for more than the minimum benefit (unrelated to contributions) often would collude with 
their employers to underreport wages so both could pay less in payroll taxes. Workers 
who expected more than the minimum benefit also would collude with their employers to 
underreport earnings prior to their last five years of work, because earnings in earlier 
years were not counted in calculating benefits.  
The Social Security funds were also poorly managed. Administrators of the funds 
were subject to political influence in making investment decisions, and sometimes 
invested funds in projects managed by friends. As a result, the funds often earned a low 
rate of return and capital was not allocated to its most productive uses. Such practices 
made the Chilean economy less efficient and slowed its rate of economic growth. Since 
pensions in payment were either not indexed for inflation or had only limited indexing, 
many retirees observed the real value of their benefits decline during the 1970s, when 
annual inflation rates under the Allende regime exceeded 1,000 percent. (Ref. #4, pg13) 
2. The New Social Security System  
In 1981, the government of Chile adopted sweeping reforms to address the old 
Social Security’s financial problems. The reforms created a new system relying on 
private, fully funded retirement programs rather than a public Social Security system. 
Under the reform, workers who had participated in the old system were given the option 
to stay with the old system or to switch to the private system after 1986; all new entrants 
into the work force were required to participate in the private system. 
Under the new system, each worker who opted for private coverage is 
required to make a monthly tax-deductible contribution equal to 10 
percent of wages to an individual pension savings account. The worker 
can voluntarily make additional tax-deductible contributions of up to 10 
percent of wages. These funds are invested, and the investment income 
accumulates tax free. The government has authorized 21 private 
investment companies, known as Administradoras de Fondas de Pensiones 
(AFPs), to administer and invest the individual account funds. The 
companies were specially created for this purpose and are not allowed to 
engage in other business or financial activities. Several American 
investment firms are now involved in owning and operating AFPs. New 
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York-based Bankers Trust has a 42 percent ownership share of the largest 
AFP, Provida, which holds 25 percent of the private system’s assets. 
Aetna Life and Casualty of Hartford owns 51 percent of the second-largest 
AFP, Santa Maria. Workers are required to place their account with one 
of the 21 investment companies, although they can switch their account 
among the companies on short notice. The companies can invest in 
government and corporate bonds, mortgages, stocks, bank certificates of 
deposit and other financial instruments, but they are required to hold a 
diversified portfolio with limited risk. At the end of 1990, the AFPs had 
invested 44.1 percent of their funds in government bonds, 17.4 percent in 
bank time deposits, 16.1 percent in mortgage bonds, 11.3 percent in 
common stocks and 11.1 percent in corporate bonds. Until now, 
investment in foreign stocks has been prohibited, but reforms expected to 
be adopted soon will allow some foreign investment. Each company is 
required to provide a minimum rate of return on pension account funds, 
set as an average of the percentage of the average return earned by all 21 
companies. The government guarantees this minimum return, which in 
effect means that the government is the insurer of the last resort. (Ref. #4, 
pg14) 
 
At retirement, workers can use the funds accumulated in their accounts to finance 
their retirement benefits in one of three ways: they can use all of their funds to buy an 
annuity from an insurance company that pays a specified annual income for life plus 
survivors benefits for their dependents, backed by a government guarantee; they can keep 
their account with the investment company and make periodic withdrawals, leaving the 
remaining funds in their estate to be passed on to their children or other heirs; or, if they 
have more than enough funds in their accounts to pay normal expected benefits, they can 
withdraw the excess as they choose. The amount of retirement benefits an individual will 
receive depends on the rate of return earned by the private account investments.  
The reform was structured with the expectation that employees contributing the 
required amounts into the system over their entire working lives would receive retirement 
benefits equal to 70 percent of their final salary, plus survivors benefits (survivors 
benefits are equal to 50 percent of the worker’s retirement benefits for a surviving spouse 
or dependent parents, and an additional 15 percent for each dependent child). This is a 
high benefit level, since 70 percent of final salary generally is considered sufficient by 
itself to enable retirees to maintain almost the same standard of living they enjoyed 
during their working years. By contrast, the U.S. Social Security system pays about 42 
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percent of previous income for average income employees. Some estimate that retirement 
benefits under the private system in Chile are 70 percent higher than under the old 
system. (Ref. #4, pg15) 
The retirement age under the new system is 65 for men and 60 for women. 
Employees might retire earlier if they have accumulated sufficient assets to pay at least 
50 percent of their average earnings over the previous 10 years and 100 percent of the 
minimum wage (which is approximately $170 U.S. dollars per month) (“EL Mercurio” 
Newspaper Dec. 2002). Workers also might choose to retire later, with their funds 
continuing to accumulate. The government guarantees a minimum pension benefit to all 
employees under the private system, supplementing the employee’s private benefits to the 
extent necessary to achieve the minimum. The amount of this minimum pension benefit 
is 85 percent of the minimum wage, increased to 90 percent for retirees age 70 and over. 
Chile’s minimum wage is about half of its average wage. Thus, the minimum pension 
benefit guarantee under the private system is equal to about 40 percent of average wages, 
which is about what the U.S. Social Security system pays to average income employees. 
(Ref. #4, pg15) Employees under the new system also are required to contribute 
additional funds to purchase private life and disability insurance. These funds are added 
to the employee’s AFP and are used to purchase coverage from private insurance 
companies. The additional contributions for this purpose vary among the AFPs, but the 
average is 1.5 percent of wages. 
The private insurance policies replace the benefits paid by the old system 
for disability or death occurring during the worker’s pre-retirement years. 
The disability policy, along with funds accumulated in the worker’s 
retirement account, pays a monthly benefit for the rest of the worker’s life 
equal to 70 percent of average earned wages during the 12 months prior 
to disability. The life insurance policy, along with the worker’s retirement 
funds, pays the same benefit (as a percentage of income) to a surviving 
spouse, dependent parents and dependent children as is paid to the 
survivors of retirees. The disability benefits under the new system amount 
to at least twice as much as under the old system, and the new system’s 
survivor benefits are at least 50 percent more. In addition, the government 
guarantees the same minimum benefit for disability as for retirement, and 
it guarantees minimum survivors benefits as well. (Ref. #4, pg15) 
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Administrative fees for the AFPs are as low as one percent of wages on average, 
and the total payments required under the private system are approximately 13 percent 
(10% of wage for old-age pension; 3% of wage for survivor and disability pension and 
administrative fees).  This represents a reduction of about 40 percent from the total taxes 
paid into the old system (20 percent). All benefits under the private system are indexed 
for inflation. The agreements for retirement annuities are written to leave the insurer 
responsible for maintaining the real value of promised benefits each year. Similarly, the 
agreements for disability and life insurance coverage require the insurer to maintain 
promised benefits in real terms. The government-guaranteed minimum benefit is also 
indexed for inflation. This inflation protection is visible because the private capital 
market regularly pays a rate of return in excess of the rate of inflation. Many investments 
are made in real terms with the borrower obligated to pay back the real value of the loan 
plus a fixed amount of real interest.  
Under the private system, employers no longer pay payroll taxes. But they were 
required to pay all employees an 18 percent wage increase at the time the privatization 
was adopted. For employees under the new system, this meant a net increase of about 10 
percent in take-home pay, after they made the required contributions for retirement and 
survivors and disability insurance. Employees continuing under the old system now bear 
the full burden of the payroll tax for that system. With the mandated 18 percent wage 
increase, workers remaining in the old system were left with about the same take-home 
pay as before the reform. For those who made the switch, the government issued special 
nontransferable bonds called recognition bonds. This was to compensate them for their 
past contributions to the old Social Security system. The bonds represented a sum almost 
equal to the proportion of benefits already earned under the public system by past 
contributions. The sum is indexed to increase with inflation and earns interest until the 
employee retires. The accumulated sum will be added to the funds in the worker’s 
individual retirement account to finance the employee’s retirement benefits. Employees 
under the private system are also eligible for the government-guaranteed minimum 
benefit. All employees who switched to the private system are assured of receiving 
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payments at least as high a benefit as promised under the old system, and probably 
higher. (Ref. #4, pg16-17)           
The government finances the recognition bonds, minimum benefits and 
benefits currently being paid under the old system out of general revenues. 
The reform also abolished an additional payroll tax of more than 10 
percent, which financed unemployment insurance, workmen’s 
compensation and family assistance benefits. These benefits are now paid 
out of general revenues, and a value-added tax was adopted to help 
finance them. (Ref. #4, pg17) 
 
The privatization has been highly popular and successful. More than 90 percent of 
the employees in the old Social Security system have voluntarily opted for the new 
private system. Employees who did not do so were mainly those close to retirement 
without enough working years left to qualify for minimum benefits under the private 
system. The new system completely eliminates the chronic long-term financing problems 
of the old system because benefits are based strictly on the employees’ accumulated 
savings. As a result, general revenue contributions to cover chronic deficits and payroll 
tax increases to avoid long-term financial gaps are no longer required. The new system 
improves the employees’ freedom of choice and gives them full control over own 
resources. The private retirement investment accounts are completely portable, following 
the employee from job to job, so the system does not limit choice in employment. 
Employees can put additional funds to their accounts, up to double the needed 10 percent 
of wage income. With the additional contributions, employees can retire early or receive 
higher benefits at the normal retirement age. They also can delay their retirement without 
penalty. Instead, a later retirement increases the benefits they will get at a later retirement 
age. (Ref. #4, pg17-18) 
In comparison to the public bureaucracies that administered funds under the old 
system, the new private retirement account funds are administered by private companies 
subject to intense competition. Employees have the legal right to move their account 
funds from one company to another. They also have access to current information 
regarding their funds and receive regular quarterly reports. 
The investment returns on funds in the private retirement accounts have 
been quite high. The latest available data show that the funds have earned 
an average real rate of return of 13 percent since the new system was 
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adopted. This performance has greatly exceeded expectations and would 
result in substantially higher-than-projected benefits, even if returns 
should fall substantially in future years. As a result of the heavy 
participation in the new system and the high returns earned on retirement 
investments, the retirement funds have grown rapidly: By the end of 1990, 
the total assets of the AFPs equaled about 25 percent of the total assets of 
the entire banking system; By the end of 1992, AFP assets were equal to 
about 40 percent of Chile’s entire GDP; The savings rate in Chile is 
reportedly more than 25 percent, which the government attributes 
primarily to the Social Security reform. (Ref. #4, pg18) 
 
Under the new private system, employees in Chile will receive far higher benefits 
than under the old system, while paying far less. Retirement benefits under the private 
system are estimated to be at least 70 percent higher than under the old system. Yet 
payments into the private system are about 40 percent less than under the old Social 
Security system. The new system’s survivors and disability benefits are at least 50 
percent higher. (Ref. #4, pg18-19) 
Indeed, due to the private retirement accounts, in less than 10 years the 
average Chilean worker will have more assets than the average American 
worker. Already, while the average Chilean earned only about $5,400 in 
1994, these workers on average had accumulated roughly $21,000 in 
assets in their private retirement accounts. In the U.S., while median 
family income was $36,812 in 1992, median household wealth was only 
around the same level. (Ref. #4, pg19) 
 
Former Labor minister, Jose Pinera, the principal architect of the new system, 
argues that the lack of a direct link between payments and contributions under the old 
system is what caused it to deteriorate into a morass of special and arbitrary privileges. 
Benefits under the private system are based completely on past contributions and returns, 
so there is no real reason for special interest groups to demand special benefits. The direct 
link between contributions and benefits under the private system should avoid the 
widespread tax evasion that prevailed under the old system. If employees contribute less 
than needed, they will receive less in benefits. Since employers no longer pay payroll 
taxes, they no longer have an incentive to underreport wages. Under the new system, 
employment and job opportunities are increasing. Improved savings and capital 
investment from the private system encourage job creation and higher real wages. The 
extreme reduction in payroll taxes under the privatization also supports job growth. High 
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payroll taxes discourage both employers from hiring and employees from working. 
Pinera suggests that the private contributions are perceived less as a tax and more as 
personal savings that enhance the workers’ personal wealth and are part of their 
employment compensation. The depressing effect of the old system’s heavy payroll tax 
burden has been reduced even further and the new system will result in still more jobs 
and increased employment. (Ref. #4, pg19) 
Employees are cultivating substantial direct ownership in the nation’s private 
business sector through investments in their private retirement accounts. This means 
more ownership of private companies, which is appealing to many in its own right. The 
new private system has also changed public opinion toward private enterprise. Employees 
are now more inclined to support public policies that create and maintain free markets 
and enhance the long-term growth and prosperity of Chilean enterprises. Pinera argues 
that the change in public opinion resulting from Social Security reform helped to make 
fundamental trade union reforms possible. With more of a direct personal stake in private 
enterprises, workers became much less supportive of militant union demands that 
threatened to damage those enterprises, workers began to favor efforts to increase 
cooperation with management and enhance the ultimate success of firms. The 10 percent 
take-home pay increase for employees under the new retirement system also helped ease 
the transition to the new trade union system. (Ref. #4, pg20) The new private system also 
helped to make possible other Chilean privatization policies. The Chilean government 
had owned numerous inefficient, heavily subsidized enterprises that it sought to sell to 
the private sector. The new funds flowing into the private investment accounts have 
expanded the capital markets and their ability to absorb shares in these state enterprises as 
they were sold to the public.  
Over the long run, Social security reform in Chile will shift the provision of 
fundamental retirement and insurance protection for workers from 
bureaucratic, monopolistic, public sector programs to competitive free 
markets. The reform creates a new system based on individual economic 
liberty, freedom of choice and workers’ control over their own resources. 
The new system does retain substantial continued government involvement 
through supervision, regulation, guarantees and the payment of minimum 
benefits. But the reform probably involves the single most massive 
dismantling of public sector social insurance in modern history. Eduardo 
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Aquilera, a top union leader in Chile and an original opponent of the 
reform, now evaluates the new system this way: I have always believed in 
the saying ‘the money where my eyes can see it’ [“la plata donde mis ojos te 
vean”] and in the AFP system my money goes to my individual account and 
is mine, and the government cannot use it as they see fit. After 14 years, I 
am now enthusiastic about [the reform]. I have U.S. $100,000 in my pension 
account [on annual income of U.S. $18,000] and that is the best guarantee 
of my future pension. The bottom line is that the private system has been an 
enormous advancement for the Chilean workers. Similarly, Robert Myers, 
Chief Actuary of the U.S. Social Security Administration from 1947 to 1970 
and an opponent of a private option for Social Security in the United States, 
evaluated the new private system in Chile this way: in summary, the new 
system – both as to its design and as to its performance – is excellent. (Ref. 
#4, pg20-21)  
 
B. CONCLUSION  
Chile’s success in transferring the retirement pension system from a “pay-as-you-
go” basis to a fully privatized personal account system was not free of opposition. Many 
Chileans, including  employees who support and believe in individual economic liberty, 
freedom of choice and workers’ control over their own resources, were not so sure 
whether or not the new private system would provide better retirement benefits. This 
Chilean privatization model, which has been widely adopted in Latin America (e.g. Peru 
and Argentina,) could be applicable and useful for other countries that are facing long-
term Social Security financial problems. It may not be required to copy the Chile’s model 
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V. RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS 
A. RECOMMENDATIONS 
As shown from the previous chapters, America’s Social Security system is in 
trouble. Its retirement policies need to change significantly. Almost everybody agrees on 
the need and importance of the reform, but there is no simple, cheap, and single solution 
which would satisfy all parties’ interests and solve the Social Security’s financial 
problem. Based on the above broadly discussed reform alternatives and other countries’ 
similar experiences, I recommend three basic reform proposals in a priority order. I 
believe that they could help to solve the serious financial problem of the United States 
Social Security system, if policy makers apply them properly without political influence. 
1. Privatization 
Privatized Social Security has succeeded when tried. There is no indication of 
failure or dissatisfaction by any nation which switched from a pay-as-you-go Social 
Security system to a new private system. A number of nations, including Chile, Australia, 
Great Britain, Hungary and Singapore, have switched from untrustworthy pay-as-you-go 
government Social Security systems to retirement programs based on private savings and 
investment. Both the individuals involved and these countries’ economies have prospered 
from the switch. I do not see any reason why a private system as proven by other 
countries would not work to solve the serious long-term financial problem of the United 
States’ Social Security system. 
Many people are critical that the American Social Security system provides 
scandalously low retirement income in exchange for record-high payroll taxes. I am 
confident that privatization would change that. One method would allow employees to 
divert 75 percent of their Social Security tax payment into private accounts, while the 
remainder would finance benefits for current retirees. Obviously, a lot of things need to 
be considered (such as transition costs, who will manage the accounts, etc.) when policy 




2. Raise the Payroll Tax and Increase the Number of Years for 
Calculating Benefits  
As discussed in Chapter III, raising the payroll tax rate by one percent of wages 
would solve 50 percent of Social Security’s current financial problems. Increasing the 
number of years for calculating benefits, for example from 35 years to 40 years, would 
solve 21 percent of the problem. Therefore, if policy makers were to implement both 
these proposals together, they could solve almost 71% of the problem. These proposals 
would have relatively limited unintended consequences compared to most other proposals 
and likely better support for solving the current Social Security financial problems. 
3. Raise the Payroll Tax Rate    
The third option would be to raise the payroll tax only. Increasing the total tax 
rate by one percent of the wages (half to employees and half to employers), is still a 
powerful proposal with limited possible side effects; it could solve about half of the 
Social Security’s current financial problems. Most people prefer a tax increase over a 
benefit decrease. This proposal is much better than doing nothing. 
B. CONCLUSIONS 
In general, the American Social Security’s financial problems are very complex 
and closely tied to the nation’s total budget. As a result, any changes would be influenced 
by many politicians and interest groups.  These interested parties all make it very tough 
issue to deal with. But doing nothing would be a huge mistake. If the politicians of both 
parties do not have the political will to solve the Social Security problem now, there will 
be little hope to do so when the baby boomers start collecting Social Security as well as 
Medicare and Medicaid benefits. 
Reformers in the United States can learn several lessons from the experiences of 
other countries around the world. In implementing their systems of funded private 
accounts, these countries have grappled with problems that the U.S. will face, as U.S. 
policymakers decide how to shape their system. Their solutions are not necessarily 100% 
right for the United States, but these solutions do provide reformers with a menu of tested 
options. The potential solutions are there. To implement them will take political courage 
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